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BUDGET MANAGEMENT THAT COUNTS: RECENT APPROACHES TO BUDGET 
AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND* 
 
Introduction 
A series of reforms in the New Zealand public sector, between 1984 and 1994, 
radically changed how the financial management framework operated.  The most 
visible changes resulted from the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA) and the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994 (FRA). The reforms have been widely publicised and are not 
discussed here.1 
This paper will review how fiscal and budget management has evolved over the last ten 
years, in response to the financial management framework. We focus on the top-down 
management of spending aggregates.  Specifically our two key tools for baseline 
management are: 
•  fixed nominal baselines for departmental spending; and 
•  the fiscal provisions framework. 
1  FIXED NOMINAL BASELINES 
1.1 Background 
Under the PFA, government financial reporting moved from an input to an output basis.  
Previously, appropriations for each department were made based on three input types 
(personnel, operating costs and capital).  The PFA required that appropriations be 
specified according to the nature of the outputs (i.e. goods or services) produced by 
each department.  
Under the old system, the budget process involved making regular adjustments to 
personnel costs based on the outcome of public service wage negotiations.  Similarly,  
the other two streams were generally adjusted annually to reflect expected cost 
movements. Government budgets were made only for the year to come, and no 
forecasts were presented for spending in subsequent years.  
Under  the PFA, appropriations for departmental spending were instead based on an 
output price2.  As the funding for particular inputs was no longer specified in the annual 
appropriation, departmental chief executives were free to determine which inputs to 
purchase in order to provide the contracted output at the specified price.  This price 
was no longer subject to automatic formula-based adjustments based on input cost 
                                                
*  We wish to acknowledge the review and comments provided by members of the Budget 
& Macroeconomic Branch, including Mark Ahern, Andrew Crisp, Kirsten Jensen and John 
Janssen. We also thank participants at the Australasian Treasury Officers Conference, 
October 2000, for comments on an earlier version of the paper.  This paper is a 
companion paper to Treasury Working Paper 01/25 by John Janssen. 
1  For an understanding of the detail involved in the New Zealand public sector financial 
management reforms, see The Treasury (1996). 
2  Output prices are fully costed, contain no hidden subsidies, and where possible are 
based on market based comparisons.  The original input costs also influenced the output 
price established.   3
changes, but instead was notionally benchmarked to a hypothetical market price for the 
good or service being provided. 
The reality however is that few departmental outputs can be benchmarked to an 
external market price.  In the absence of evidence justifying a price increase, there is 
no mechanism in the budget process to increase an output price from year to year.  To 
the extent that departments are required to manage input cost changes within existing 
funding levels, the effect is a real saving in departmental spending each year 
equivalent to the rate of inflation. 
The removal of automatic adjustments for departmental outputs is referred to 
throughout this paper as “fixed nominal baselines”3.   
1.2  Impact on fiscal and budget management 
Fixing nominal baselines meant that, for forecast purposes, government spending 
could be characterised as being split into two tracks: “formula-driven” (i.e. indexation) 
and “fixed” (i.e. no change to nominal amounts). 
Indexation still applies to much non-departmental (or Crown) spending. In particular, 
welfare benefits are adjusted annually for inflation, superannuation payments are 
indexed to the average wage, and health and education spending are automatically 
adjusted for demographic changes. 
The nominal value of the majority of all other spending is assumed, for forecast 
purposes, to remain constant over the forecast period. A specific policy decision of the 
government is required to change the amount spent on non-indexed outputs. Any such 
increases must be traded off against other new expenditure priorities, and form part of 
the annual budget negotiations.  
A dual budget process has developed. As part of the Budget Baseline Update, 
departments can request changes to their three-year forecast budgets (or “baselines”) 
for formula-driven items, based on changes to demographics, inflation or wage growth 
as appropriate.  Any other spending increases are agreed through the Budget 
Initiatives process, where increases have to be met from a limited pool of funds 
allocated for new budget spending, and traded off against spending proposals in all 
other areas. 
In contrast to the previous system the burden of proof is now on the department to 
demonstrate that it will not be able to deliver services effectively within existing funding 
levels. In practice this has proved to be a high hurdle. Very few departments have had 
funding explicitly agreed for price increases, as the general assumption is that 
departments should be able to make annual efficiency gains that are at least equivalent 
to the rate of inflation.  
While this is the general position, some departments may have found other ways to 
respond to input pressures.  For example, departments may have responded by 
redefining their core business more narrowly and bidding for funds for projects that 
would, in the past, have been carried out within baselines. Similarly, in the case of 
some large departments (e.g. Police), regular increases in baselines have been 
agreed, but the budget process hasn’t provided the leverage required where output 
measurement is imprecise, and it is not clear that additional outputs are being 
produced.  
                                                
3  The “baseline” is the agreed budget allocation over the forecast period.   4
1.3  Benefits of fixed nominal baselines 
Fixing nominal baselines has often been perceived as a mechanism that reduced growth in 
public expenditure. However, the impact of introducing the policy needs to be 
evaluated in the context of other concurrent changes. 
Between 1991 and 1993, at the same time as it put a halt to most automatic 
expenditure increases, the government made cuts to all departmental baselines of 
between 1% and 5%. In addition, many government agencies have downsized since 
1989; and it seems likely that efficiency gains have been made over the period in most 
areas (information technology being a key driver). However, it is difficult to isolate the 
impact of removing indexation from that of other public sector reforms. It is also difficult 
to measure what changes in quality or quantity of outputs have taken place over this 
period.4 
In considering whether the policy did serve to reduce expenditure growth, it is useful to 
consider how budget targets are formulated.  Since 1994, operating balance (or budget 
surplus) targets in the annual budget process have generally been set within the 
framework of the FRA (discussed in section 1.5). That is, annual expenditure targets 
are initially determined by a ‘top-down’ process based on long-term fiscal objectives 
and revenue forecasts, rather than a ‘bottom-up’ process driven by indexation 
processes. This suggests that any savings made by holding most spending on existing 
departmental outputs fixed would likely have been “spent” via an increase in the 
amount of funding available for allocation to new programmes in the budget round.  
The real gain obtained by removing indexation therefore relates to an increase in the 
government’s ability to scrutinise and reprioritise spending on existing outputs.  
Departments are now required to submit a formal budget bid for any compensation for 
the loss in real resources due to fixing nominal baselines. This gives Ministers the 
opportunity to compare the benefits of increased spending on existing programmes 
with those that might arise from spending on new programmes.  Rather than reducing 
spending in total, fixing nominal baselines therefore facilitates the reallocation of 
spending from one area to another.  This is what makes the policy a key tool in 
improving the effectiveness of government spending as a whole.  
1.4  Risks of fixed nominal baselines 
Criticism of the policy has focused on those areas of government spending that may be 
a low budget priority for Ministers but are nevertheless essential services (e.g. 
elements of government administration). These areas may find it difficult to maintain 
their real level of resourcing via budget negotiations and service delivery may be put at 
risk. In the mid 1990s, in response to concerns that departmental capability in some 
areas might be suffering through under-funding, an Output Price Review mechanism 
was put into place. Departments facing input cost pressures were able to request a 
review of output pricing levels, overseen by an interdepartmental officials committee. In 
the last five years only five such reviews have been carried out, with mixed results (in 
one case funding levels dropped).  
Another risk is the volatility of the real efficiency gain each year, which varies with the 
rate of inflation.  An alternative would be to index baselines to inflation, and 
simultaneously extract a predetermined efficiency dividend.   
                                                
4  For a fuller discussion of the expenditure impact of public sector reforms, see Petrie and 
Webber (2001).   5
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We believe however that the fixed nominal baselines policy has two distinct 
advantages: 
•  simplicity: there is no need to introduce into the process negotiations and 
decisions around the appropriate indexation levels; and 
•  certainty: departments can plan based on known nominal levels of future funding.  
1.5  Interaction with the long-term fiscal framework 
The mid-1990s saw further developments in the fiscal management framework. In 1994 
the FRA was passed, requiring the Government to establish long-term objectives and 
track progress against them.  At the same time, New Zealand was moving out of a 
period of fiscal crisis. Government spending began to increase more rapidly, though 
still at a rate less than revenue growth.  
Budget management processes needed to adapt to the challenges of a surplus 
environment. A key issue that emerged was the relationship between fixed nominal 
baselines and the fiscal forecasts. Three-year budget forecasts prepared under GAAP5 
between 1994 and 1996 would include increases in government spending only for 
those areas that had automatic indexation. All other spending was assumed to remain 
constant over time. While this assumption could arguably have been justified over the 
early 1990s during the period of fiscal crisis, by 1994 this was no longer the case.  
Because the fiscal forecasts did not allow for increased spending in future Budgets, 
they understated the likely spending profiles. This resulted in optimistic projections of 
the progress towards the long-term fiscal objectives, which reduced the discipline on 
the annual Budget process6. This forecast “bias” is illustrated below: 
Operating Balance for 1997/98 – Change in Forecasts 
The graph illustrates the forecasts 
for the 1997/98 financial year at 
different points in time, starting 
from the first time it was forecast 
through to the actual result. 
The provisions were introduced 
into the forecasts during the 1997 
Budget. (The forecast increased 
due to favourable forecasting 
changes to expenses and Crown 
entity surpluses – mainly liability 
valuation changes). 
Prior to the introduction of the 
provisions, the graph demonstrates the impact of rising revenue growth but fixed 
baselines (i.e. assuming no new spending other than indexation of items such as 
benefit payments): the initial operating balance forecast is unrealistic, and reduces 
over time. 
                                                
5  Generally Accepted Accounting Practice – use of accounting standards that in New 
Zealand are the same for the private and public sector.  GAAP is defined in the PFA. 
6  The 10-year progress outlooks did include higher spending track scenarios and therefore 
did provide some measure of a more realistic path towards long-term objectives.   6
There were also pressures from a political perspective to find a better way to represent 
spending intentions in the forecasts. In 1996, New Zealand moved to a proportional 
representation voting system and the first Coalition Government was elected. The 
government formation process threw up two challenges for the coalition: 
•  to alleviate any concerns that a coalition government would usher in a period of 
instability, incoming Ministers needed a way to demonstrate fiscal prudence; 
•  there was now an opportunity for portfolio ministers from different coalition parties 
to bid up spending in their sector, by turning the issue into a coalition dispute.  
Both pressures could be managed if some kind of overall spending cap was agreed by 
both parties.  The response was a statement from the new government committing to a 
$5 billion cap7 on new spending over a three-year term of government to 1999/2000, 
on top of changes already included in the forecasts (i.e. on top of the formula-driven 
items). 
Treasury officials were charged with working out how the $5 billion spending cap would 
work in practice. The cap evolved into a mechanism now known as the “fiscal 
provisions”.  
2 FISCAL  PROVISIONS 
2.1  What are the fiscal provisions? 
The provisions framework consists of a pre-determined fiscal limit across the 
parliamentary cycle (three years, generally from November to November), and a set of 
principles and rules for “counting" against that limit. The limit is a pool of funds 
available for implementing government policy. The principles and rules establish when 
the fiscal implications of policy decisions will be “counted” against the limit. 
When fiscal forecasts are produced, the provisions sit “on top of” the projected 
expenditure for existing government programmes and policies. This means they 
represent the operating balance impact of changes to existing policy, whether this be 
an increase in funding for an existing policy or funding for new policy. The framework 
focuses on ministerial decision-making and, therefore, only applies to discrete policy 
decisions. This means the framework excludes those automatic forecasting or 
indexation changes that are factored into baselines based on previously agreed 
parameters, with little ministerial input from year to year.  
This means that the provisions framework built onto and extended the existing practice 
of using fixed nominal baselines for most departmental spending, while allowing 
forecasting changes (i.e. formula-driven items) to fluctuate with the state of the 
economy. For example, an increase in benefit payments due to higher unemployment 
would not be financed from (or “count against”) the provisions. If, on the other hand, the 
government decides to increase the amount of the benefit payment, the resulting 
increase in forecast benefit payments would count against the provisions.  
                                                
7  Equivalent to 1.6% of GDP on average across three years.   7
Beyond the three-year Parliamentary cycle, forecasts include a proxy for the provisions 
that is referred to as a “technical”8 provision,  representing potential future policy 
decisions to be made as part of future Budgets. The technical provision is determined 
by the Treasury (and agreed to by Ministers) based on an approximate average of the 
cost of new policy over the last few years.9  
2.2  How are the provisions operationalised? 
New Zealand is now partway through the second set of three-year fiscal provisions. Set 
out below are the steps we went through to operationalise the framework.  Since 1996 
these processes have been gradually refined and institutionalised. 
Step 1: Agree the amount of the provision 
The first step was to advise the incoming government on an appropriate three-year 
target. Establishing fiscal provisions requires a Government to consider what its long-
term objectives are in relation to the operating balance, debt reduction, and future 
expense pressures. This will determine what resources are available in the short-term. 
By way of example, the current Government’s fiscal provisions have been set at 
$5.9 billion (GST inclusive) over the 1999/2000 – 2002/03 period10. The calculation 
was based on the most recent set of fiscal forecasts at the time (October 1999), and 
the Government’s potential longer-term parameters.11 
                                                
8    The term “technical” is used to emphasise the fact that as yet there is no political 
commitment to the projected expenditure target.  In the 2001 Budget the “technical” 
provisions were altered to “indicative” provisions to provide a better indication of potential 
future spending (outlined in the Fiscal Strategy Report page 23 of B.2 & B.3). 
9  In the current 10-year fiscal projections required as part of the Fiscal Strategy Report, the 
amount set aside beyond the fiscal forecast horizon is termed a “fiscal allowance” as 
opposed to a fiscal provision. The allowance indicates the fiscal flexibility the Government 
has for spending and revenue initiatives, contributions to partially pre-fund future New 
Zealand superannuation pressures, and responding to developments in the economic 
and fiscal position. It provides a broad indication of flexibility rather than a specific policy 
commitment. 
10  Equivalent to 1.7% of GDP on average across three years. 
11  Long-term fiscal parameters included:  
(i)  Rising surpluses at least to the level of the October 1999 forecasts ($0.0 billion in 
1999/2000, $0.8 billion in 2000/01 (0.7% of GDP), $1.7 billion in 2001/02 (1.4% of 
GDP) and $2.3 billion in 2002/03 (1.9% of GDP)) to enable a contribution to 
partially pre-fund future New Zealand Superannuation pressures; 
(ii)  A longer-term debt objective of keeping net Crown debt below 20% of GDP. 
(iii)  Keeping expenses around current levels of about 35% of GDP. 
Reversing the previous Government’s promised tax cut and introducing a higher marginal 
tax rate of 39% on incomes greater than $60,000 – along with the provisions already in 
the October 1999 forecasts – enabled a total of $5.9 billion to be allocated to establish a 
limit for the fiscal provisions (across the short-term forecast horizon of the remainder of 
the current year plus three years).   8
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Step 2: Allocate the provision across three years 
The second step was to allocate the total provision over the three-year period. The 
original $5 billion provision was defined as a cumulative, three-year total (see diagram 
below), and this framework is still used. The provision needs to be phased across the 
three years in accordance with the expected profile of decisions. In illustration, the 
current government’s three-year fiscal provisions are set out below: 
Cumulative Provisions – Including the 2000 Fiscal Strategy Report Extract 
The expense track includes a fiscal 
provision of $5.9 billion (GST 
inclusive) for the next three years12 
to be used on priority policy 
objectives. The allocation of the 
provision has been finalised during 
the Budget 2000 process on a 
cumulative basis at (GST inclusive) 
$420 million for the remaining months 
in 1999/2000, $1.2 billion in 2000/01, 
$1.8 billion in 2001/02 and $2.4 billion 
in 2002/03 (0.4%, 1.1%, 1.5% and 
2.0% of GDP respectively). 
Provisions are cumulative, assuming 
that a decision taken to increase a 
department’s baseline in 2000/01 will generally represent a permanent increase. The 
provisions provide for the annual increase to “roll out” into the following years. Each 
individual cumulative provision totals to the $5.9 billion total allocation. 
 
The allocation of a budget target over a three-year period represented a step forward 
for budget management. Previously, the focus had been on the “annual” budget pot 
available for distribution. A three-year spending programme allows the government to 
phase in more significant initiatives such as tax cuts, while showing how they could be 
credibly funded as part of a three-year policy process. It also enables Ministers to 
deliver significant one-off packages in key portfolios, rather than drip-feeding annual 
funding increases.  For example, Ministers would have the option of deferring a suite of 
environmental initiatives to a later budget in order to enable significant tax cuts in a 
current budget.  
Step 3: Clarify the “principles” governing impacts on the provision 
The third step was to establish the “principles (or rules)” that determine which items 
would be treated as forecast changes, and which would be treated as specific policy 
decisions that would “count” against the provisions. Development of the principles 
turned out to be far from simple, and the principles have evolved considerably since 
1996 (Annex One outlines the current guidelines as set down at October 2000). 
                                                
12  The $5.9 billion provision covers three years.  However, because the parliamentary term 
begins in November and the financial year begins in July, the expenditure needs to be 
allocated across four financial years. The small amount of expenditure allocated in 
1999/2000 year provided for new government initiatives implemented before the 
Government’s first budget took effect from 1 July 2000.    9
Compared with the previous system, the key innovation in developing the principles 
was to include all policy decisions that impacted on the operating balance. In the past, 
tax policy decisions and policy decisions affecting state-owned enterprises and Crown 
entity surpluses had tended to be made in isolation of “spending” budget decisions. 
These have now been explicitly brought into the budgeting framework to enable the 
Government to consider all policy proposals (that impact on the operating balance) as 
part of the same decision-making process. 
Step 4: Implementation 
The final step was to implement the framework through: 
•  informing ministers and departments of the allocations and principles (by issuing 
Treasury circulars); 
•  adjusting Cabinet Office procedures by requiring that all Cabinet papers state the 
impact on the fiscal provisions of specific policy recommendations; 
•  establishing Treasury procedures to record decisions impacting on the 
provisions; 
•  adjusting budget processes: the original Budget Baseline Update process has 
now been redefined to exclude any proposals impacting on the provisions – all 
such proposals must now be considered as part of the Budget Initiatives round; 
•  incorporating reporting against the fiscal provisions in the budget documents. 
Targets are stated in the Budget Policy Statement; and the impact of policy 
decisions is documented in each Economic and Fiscal Update (Annex Two 
provides an example from the 2000 Budget documentation illustrating the level of 
transparency of disclosure). 
In effect the fiscal provisions have set up a second fiscal monitoring process, in parallel 
with the monitoring of the overall operating balance. 
2.3  The provisions tell only part of the story 
The fiscal provisions are only one element of the operating balance – they represent 
the discretionary policy decisions that are most easily controllable by governments in 
the short term. Other elements – such as benefits and revenue changes, or valuation 
changes, are less amenable to the direct short-term control of the Government.  The 
provisions framework therefore helps ensure that annual budgeting decisions can focus 
on shorter-term pressures, while longer term pressures are able to be addressed either 
by the three-year framework provided by the total provisions target, or by the medium-
to-long term targets established in the Budget Policy Statements and Fiscal Strategy 
Reports required under the FRA 
One obvious driver of the operating balance that is beyond the direct short-term control 
of the government is the impact of the business cycle13. 
A second driver, with the move to accrual accounting, is fluctuation due to changes in 
liability valuations. At the moment, two significant liabilities (Accident Compensation 
Corporation outstanding claims obligation and Government Superannuation Fund 
(GSF) unfunded liability) are valued on a fair value basis and subject to discount rate 
changes. New Zealand GAAP is heading in the direction of applying the fair value 
                                                
13  Refer Buckle, Kim and Tam (2001) and Tam and Kirkham (2001).   10
approach to a wider range of assets and liabilities, and therefore increasing the 
potential impact on the operating balance.  
By way of example, for the year ended 30 June 1999, the GSF unfunded liability 
increased by around $600 million (0.6% of GDP) from that forecast – due largely to a 
change in how the discount rate was calculated. No change was required to the fiscal 
provisions, as no long-term threat existed to the achievement of the Government’s 
objectives (see Annex Three for an illustration of how focusing on fiscal provisions 
influences the trend of the operating balance – and why short-term fluctuations from 
“fair value” changes need to be considered from a longer-term perspective)14. 
In setting the three-year target for the operating provisions, the Government faces 
uncertainty regarding economic performance and likely cost pressures. The 
Government needs to take into account the fact that fiscal plans may need to change if 
circumstances turn out different to current forecasts. Key uncertainties that impact on 
the operating balance include: 
•  the economic outlook and its impact on fiscal parameters - economic conditions 
impact directly on revenue streams, finance costs and beneficiary numbers;  
•  changes in the value of Crown assets and liabilities - for example, a decrease in 
real interest rates increases the value of both the ACC liability and GSF liability, 
therefore reducing the operating balance. 
These impacts, driven by the economic cycle, are beyond the immediate control of the 
Government. As a general approach, we would recommend that no change be made to 
the provisions target in response to forecast changes due to the factors described 
above. This allows the automatic fiscal stabilisers15 to operate through the cycle.  
However, it may be appropriate for the Government to consider adjusting the 
provisions in the case of an economic shock that is likely to have long-lasting impacts. 
For example, at the time of the 1998 Asian crisis forecasts and projections showed that 
progress towards the previous Government’s long-term objectives was significantly 
reduced.  See Janssen (2001) for details. 
                                                
14  In the 2001 Budget, a new fiscal indicator was introduced – OBERAC – Operating 
Balance Excluding Revaluations and Accounting policy Changes.  OBERAC removes 
revaluation movements and accounting policy changes to provide a measure of 
underlying financial stewardship.  For a fully explanation refer New Zealand Government 
(2001) pp 76 . 
15  In considering the fiscal position, it is important to focus on trends and to abstract from 
short-term fluctuations about the trends. If government spending and tax plans remain 
unchanged during an upswing, higher tax revenues and lower spending on 
unemployment result in improving fiscal surpluses (and vice versa in the case of a 
downturn). These fluctuations occur because actual output in the economy fluctuates 
about its productive potential. Allowing these so-called “automatic stabilisers” to operate 
across the economic cycle takes pressure off monetary policy and reduces fluctuations in 
employment and output. For these reasons the Government’s general approach is to let 
these automatic stabilisers operate unhindered.   11
In response, the previous Government agreed to progressively reduce the three-year 
provisions target of $5 billion to $4.25 billion16. The result was to ensure steadier 
progress was made over the three-year period towards the long-term objectives.   
Essentially, the provisions provide the Government with an opportunity to credibly 
demonstrate that it is following through on its fiscal intentions. The operating balance is 
subject to too many other factors to be a complete measure by itself in the short-term. 
2.4  Benefits of the provisions 
Progressively through the last three years, the provisions framework has become: 
•  the way in which the Government can demonstrate that short-term fiscal policy is 
consistent with achievement of longer-term objectives; 
•  the means of improving budget decision making, to ensure a more strategic 
three-year focus rather than solely an annual focus; and 
•  a tool for Ministers to focus on a more definable and manageable “target” than 
the operating balance (as discussed in section 2.3 above). 
A more realistic total spending profile was (and is) presented for the forecast years. 
The result has been: 
•  fiscal forecasts that provide a better indication of expected progress towards the 
Government’s long-term objectives (therefore enhancing the credibility of the 
fiscal forecasts); and 
•  that the fiscal provisions have become one of the anchors of fiscal policy by 
which the Government is judged.  
The increased prominence that commentators have placed on the fiscal provisions has 
increased the focus of the Government on its decision-making, and therefore 
introduced greater certainty into fiscal planning. The Government can see what it 
needs to do to meet its fiscal objectives, and knows whether it can meet its policy and 
fiscal objectives without running out of resources. 
Fiscal provision limits support sound day-to-day fiscal management. By defining an 
overall limit first, the framework has focused decision-making on trade-offs between 
policy options. All decisions impacting on the operating balance, whether spending, 
revenue or SOE surplus decisions, are considered in a common framework.  
In terms of budget management, ministers and chief executives have clear signals on 
which to base expectations of new resources in each budget round. Provided that the 
limit is sufficiently tight, ministers and chief executives will be encouraged to reprioritise 
within their budgets. This should also help the Government deliver value for money. 
                                                
16  While the previous Government reduced the fiscal provisions, other decisions made at 
the time had more of an influence over the longer-term – ensuring that the long-term 
targets could still be attained.   12
2.5 Challenges  that  remain 
The fiscal provisions framework is proving a useful tool for fiscal policy. However, as 
with any tool, it evolves as experience develops.  Some future challenges are briefly 
scoped below: 
Rolling out provisions beyond the parliamentary term 
The fiscal provisions framework is established for the parliamentary term. However the 
fiscal forecasts do extend beyond the term, more so as the term progresses. As noted 
in section 2.1 “technical provisions” are included to ensure a realistic “spending” profile 
is maintained. 
A problem occurs when a government makes decisions that impact beyond the horizon 
of its fiscal provisions. Such spending increases beyond the period of the provisions 
are not captured by the provisions framework.   The technical provisions for future 
spending beyond the current term of government are not automatically reduced in this 
case, as no government commitment has been made to maintain those forecast 
expenditure levels. This is termed the “bow wave” effect (to describe expenditure creep 
beyond the current budget period). Mechanisms may be required to limit the extent of 
this problem. 
Incorporating capital into the framework 
At the moment, a capital provision, which links to the Government’s debt objectives, 
exists alongside the operating provisions. However, the setting of a capital target has 
not proved to be a totally convincing framework for assessing or controlling capital 
spending17. 
Work is currently underway that seeks to improve the capital allocation process. 
Institutionalising the fiscal provisions framework 
Although the fiscal provisions framework is prominent in the government’s budget and 
fiscal reporting, it remains an informal control mechanism. Further institutionalisation18 
could help ensure the continuation of the strengthening of the linkage to the longer-
term objectives.   
For example, in 1999 it was uncertain whether the incoming Labour/Alliance Coalition 
Government would agree to continue to use the fiscal provisions framework. In the 
event they found it a useful tool to signal fiscal intentions. However, it will be important 
to maintain continuity of the principles of operating the framework from one term of 
government to the next.  
However, institutionalisation of informal mechanisms that may need (and likely will 
need) to change to reflect a changing operating environment could be inappropriate. 
                                                
17  Capital charge is at present excluded from the operating provisions framework (as it has 
no net impact on the operating balance). A possible alternative would be to “count” capital 
charge costs associated with increases in operating spending against the operating 
provision. This would act as a proxy for the resulting increase in Crown finance costs, 
although it would reduce the linkage between the provision and the operating balance. 
18   One suggestion that could be considered is whether external auditors should review the 
impact of policy decisions on the provisions target – enhancing the framework by 
introducing an external monitoring mechanism.    13
Operation of the provisions framework 
Two particular issues include: 
•  Determining whether something impacts on the provisions can sometimes be a 
complex exercise. In applying any principle based approach, issues at the margins 
will always arise – causing differences in interpretation and application of the fiscal 
provisions framework. 
•  Despite the provisions framework being an informal control mechanism, the 
predetermined provision levels effectively become “locked in” and it is seen as 
difficult to alter the limits.  There may be good reasons why the limit needs more 
mechanisms to enable review and alteration in response to changing 
circumstances. 
Currently underway is a review to bring together the experience over the last five years 
with the aim of improving (and simplifying) the decision making processes, addressing 
some of the anomalies that can occur at the margins of the framework, as well as a 
more general review of the provisions framework itself. 
Education 
Continued education on the link to long-term objectives, and the fact it is only one 
element of the operating balance, is important. Ongoing GAAP developments are likely 
to see the introduction of greater potential for fluctuations resulting from fair value 
assessments of assets and liabilities altering through time.   14
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ANNEX 1: OPERATING PROVISION PRINCIPLES 
Determining whether something impacts on the provisions can sometimes be a 
complex exercise.  Currently underway is a review to bring together the experience 
over the last five years with the aim of improving (and simplifying) the decision making 
processes, as well as addressing some of the anomalies that can occur at the margins 
of the framework. 
Following is an extract of guidance material available to Treasury analysts, and reflects 
(in greater detail) what has been published in various Economic and Fiscal Updates 
since December 1996. 
 
Operating Balance 
Principle – All changes in the operating balance resulting from a discrete government decision 
to introduce a new initiative or change the cost of existing initiatives impact against the 
$5.9 billion limit, whether they be changes in revenue, expenses or surpluses of SOEs and 
Crown entities. 
Principle – The calculation of impacts is based on the net impact to the operating balance – 
where this can be calculated. For example, for benefit increases, the impact is net of the income 
tax component. 
Principle – Excluded from the framework are all costs associated with forecasting changes, the 
recognition of existing contingent liabilities, and costs arising from natural disasters and civil 
emergencies. 
Principle – Impacts are calculated based on the GST inclusive total, to align the framework to 
the appropriations framework. 
What this means in practice is: 
•  Gains or losses on sale of assets do not impact, even though they affect the Crown’s 
operating balance. They do not impact, as they are a direct function of the carrying value 
in the financial statements, which could vary substantially depending upon factors such 
as accounting policies, revaluation policies and timing of cyclical revaluations. 
Accordingly, the gain or loss may be considered subjective (and potentially manipulable).  
•  Any action taken to sell assets below market value by the Government will impact against 
the $5.9 billion fiscal provisions, as this would be a discrete Government decision. The 
amount that would impact is the difference between market value and the sale price.  
•  On the other hand, if a board of an SOE/CE made the decision to sell assets below 
market value with no government involvement, as opposed to being a government 
directive, then this would not impact. The government has no discretion in this instance. 
•  Devaluations only impact on the Crown operating balance where the impact of the 
devaluation exceeds the balance in the Crown’s revaluation reserve for that particular 
class of asset. Revaluations which impact on the operating balance do not count for two 
reasons: 
•  The rationale for not counting gains/losses on sale of fixed assets is that it simply 
reflects the latest valuation of the assets. The same should apply for any 
revaluation reserve deficit taken to the operating balance. 
•  Where the devaluation results from a specific government decision (e.g. to 
introduce competition and lower prices), then the change in asset value effectively 
represents the discounted value of future profits foregone, which will already have 
impacted on the fiscal provisions.    16
Policy and Forecasting Changes 
Principle – Forecasting changes do not impact on the fiscal provisions. However, there are 
boundary issues around what is a forecasting change and what is a policy change. For the 
purposes of counting, a forecasting change is a change where existing policy is such that there 
will be an automatic change in funding in response to volume change (and government 
agreement to this change is simply an administrative or rubber stamping exercise). 
Principle – Fiscal impacts of implementing existing policy do not impact. However, decisions to 
change the cost of existing initiatives do impact. 
Forecasting Changes 
•  How do you distinguish a forecasting change from a policy decision? The basic criteria for 
a forecasting change is that there is an existing policy or formula that determines that 
additional expenditure, and Cabinet approval is just an administrative or rubber-stamping 
exercise. A forecasting change includes the possibility that the baseline will be reduced if 
volumes go down. 
•  Changes to welfare benefit expenses resulting from changes to CPI (which affects CPI 
indexation) and volume changes (not attributable to a new Government initiative) do not 
impact. A Government decision to change the benefit rates, on the other hand, does 
impact. 
•  In relation to settlement of Treaty claims, the settlement itself does not impact on the 
fiscal provisions. Where there is an interest component (because this component is 
discretionary) it will impact on the fiscal provisions. However, an increase in interest 
payments due to a delay in signing the deed (which is not a result of a government 
decision) would not impact on the provisions. 
Policy (versus Forecasting) Change 
•  Prison musters: an example of the distinction between a policy decision and a forecast 
change is a decision to increase funding for prison musters. This impacts on the fiscal 
provisions, as there is no existing policy that states that there will be an 
increase/decrease in funding if prison muster levels change, i.e. it is not a forecasting 
change. There is no set formula in place that gets adjusted regularly to account for 
volume changes. 
•  A significant number of government policy decisions that will impact are made in 
response to changes in demand.  
Existing Policy Changes 
•  For example, an increase in quotas for New Zealand at the IMF: this would not impact as 
it is not a new policy decision, rather compliance with existing policy (i.e. membership of 
the IMF and associated quota contributions). 
•  There is sometimes a fine line between implementing current policy and introducing new 
policy. These situations will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis in consultation 
with the Budget Team. 
Existing Contingent Liabilities 
Principle – The recognition of existing contingent liabilities does not impact on the fiscal 
provisions. 
Examples: 
•  Settlement of existing litigation does not count and, similarly, additional litigation costs 
associated with defending an existing liability do not impact.   17
  
ANNEX 2: EXTRACT FROM 2000 BUDGET ECONOMIC AND FISCAL UPDATE 
Operating provisions for 1999/2000 to 2002/03 
In the Budget Policy Statement (BPS), the Government set out a provision for new 
spending over the four years from 1999/2000 to 2002/03 of $5.9 billion (GST inclusive). 
The allocations have altered since those outlined in the BPS, as illustrated in the 
following table. 
Table 2.5 – Change in cumulative fiscal provisions 
$ million  1999/2000  2000/01  2001/02  2002/03  Total 
Indicative fiscal provisions BPS  150  1,200  1,850  2,650  5,850 
Fiscal provisions BEFU  420  1,230  1,790  2,425  5,865 
Change  270  30  (60)  (225)  15 
Source: The  Treasury 
These amounts include a contingency for further initiatives to be developed during 
2000/01. The contingency is $180 million a year in 2000/01 and subsequent years. 
Since the BPS, the Government has decided to bring forward some spending into 
1999/2000 and 2000/01.  
To remain within the overall provision of $5.9 billion, the provisions for spending in the 
2001 and 2002 Budgets have been reduced to $550 million and $575 million.   
Budget 2000 decisions and the fiscal provisions for 1999/2000 to 2002/03 
The Government has allocated $3.65 billion of the $5.9 billion as part of the Budget 
2000 process.  This is detailed in the following table.   18
Extract from 2000 Budget Economic and Fiscal Update (Continued) 
Table 2.6 – Budget 2000 policy decisions 
2000 Budget initiatives (operating) 
($ million, GST inclusive)  1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 Total
Revenue initiatives:19      
Multi-rate fringe benefit tax  - 80  65 65  210 
Cancellation of tariff reductions  - (35) (80)  (85) (200)
Tobacco excise increase  (20)  (110) (78)  (82) (290)
Anti-avoidance measures for 39% tax 
rate - (10) (20)  (20) (50)
Total revenue  (20)  (75) (113)  (122) (330)
Expense initiatives:       
Student loan changes  32 92  103 110  337 
Other education  9 108  177 178  472 
Increases in NZ Super rates  52 208  212 212  684 
Health20 32 137  57 88  314 
Housing – income-related rents  - 55  98 104  257 
Industry and economic development  - 37  77 116  230 
Social services  (2)  56  66 71  191 
Police 27 54  54 54  189 
West Coast package  135 -  - -  135 
Inland Revenue  - 36  36 36  108 
Arts, culture and heritage  55 16  16 16  103 
Research, science and technology  - 30  30 30  90 
Cancellation of border charging  - 29  29 29  87 
Biodiversity strategy  - 17  27 38  82 
Other environment initiatives  2 21  23 22  68 
Maori Affairs  14 19  15 15  63 
Foreign Affairs and TradeNZ  - 18  16 12  46 
Justice 5 22  19 19  65 
All other initiatives  49 91  48 22  210 
Total expenses  410 1,046  1,103 1,172  3,731 
SOE/Crown entity changes       
Housing – changes to Housing NZ  30 79  70 70  249 
Total 2000 Budget  420 1,050  1,060 1,120  3,650 
Contingency for further initiatives in 
2000/01 - 180  180 180  540 
Total 2000 Budget including 
contingency  420 1,230 1,240 1,300 4,190 
Provision for 2001 Budget  - -  550 550  1,100 
Provision for 2002 Budget  - -  - 575  575 
Total fiscal provision  420 1,230  1,790 2,425  5,865 
                                                
19  A “negative” number represents an initiative that is generating a saving (or an increase in revenue) and 
therefore reduces the total amount accumulated against the fiscal provisions. 
20   This includes a correction to the Health baseline of ($84 million) in 2001/02 and 2002/03.  Total new spending 
excluding this adjustment is $481 million.   19
ANNEX 3: GRAPH SHOWING HOW THE PROVISIONS INFLUENCE THE TREND 
OF THE OPERATING BALANCE 
The following graph provides an illustrative view of how a government can influence the 
long-term track of the operating balance through a focus on the fiscal provisions. 
 
•  The operating balance increases as the economy expands, providing greater tax 
revenue, while baselines are fixed. 
•  The operating balance track is reduced through the inclusion of the provisions for 
future initiatives (or “fiscal allowances” in the years beyond the fiscal forecast 
horizon. 
•  The operating balance may fluctuate within the identified band (illustrative only21) 
due to events beyond the immediate control of the Government (such as liability 
valuation changes). 
•  By altering the fiscal parameters for new spending and baselines, the 
Government can influence the underlying operating balance track. 
•  While short-term volatility can detract from the underlying trends (in the operating 
balance or debt for example), it is the underlying trends that are central to sound 
fiscal policy action. As noted in the section 2.3, the fiscal provisions should only 
be altered if progress towards the Government’s medium- to long-term objectives 
is seriously threatened. 
                                                
21  Magnitudes (for different probabilities) are provided in Treasury Working Paper 01/11. 
 
Operating Balance (1999 Budget) 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 2006  2007 2008 2009 
Including provision 
No provision
Variation arising from economic 
variables, for example interest rates  